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In spite of substantial spending and resource utilization, today's health care remains characterized by 
poor outcomes, largely due to overuse (over-testing/treatment) or underuse (under-testing/treatment) 
of services. To a significant extent, this is a consequence of low-quality decision-making that appears 
to violate various rationality criteria. Such sub-optimal decision-making is considered a leading cause 
of death and is responsible for more than 80% of health expenses. In this paper, we address the 
issue of overuse or underuse of healthcare interventions from the perspective of rational choice 
theory. We show that what is considered rational under one decision theory may not be considered 
rational under a different theory. We posit that the questions and concerns regarding both underuse 
and overuse have to be addressed within a specific theoretical framework. The applicable rationality 
criterion, and thus the “appropriateness” of health care delivery choices, depends on theory selection 
that is appropriate to specific clinical situations. We provide a number of illustrations showing how the 
choice of theoretical framework influences both our policy and individual decision-making. We also 
highlight the practical implications of our analysis for the current efforts to measure the quality of care 














It is no secret that todays’ health care system is in crisis1,2: societies devote a substantial amount of 
resources to health care, and yet patient outcomes remain inferior. The US alone spends nearly 18% 
($3.2 trillion) of its gross domestic product (GDP) on healthcare; however, only 55% of needed 
services are delivered and more than 30% is inappropriate, and therefore wasteful, “care”.3 
Ultimately, the observed (suboptimal) care relates to the quality of medical decisions.3 Indeed, it has 
been contended that personal decisions are the leading cause of death4, and that physicians’ 
decisions are responsible for 80% of  healthcare expenditures.5,6 If decision-making can largely 
explain the relatively poor state of affairs of current health care utilization, the logical question to ask 
is: Are the decisions made during doctor-patient encounters, in fact, rational?  In a recent paper, we 
reviewed existing theories of rationality and their implications for medical practice.7 We found that no 
single model of rationality can fit all medical contexts; what is considered “rational behavior” under 
one rationality theory may be considered “irrational” under another one.7 We call this “normative 
pluralism”, which, as explained in detail below, calls for the matching of a given clinical 
situation/problem with a given theory of rationality. 
In this paper, we extend this analysis of rational decision-making in clinical medicine to demonstrate 
the practical importance of this debate for the question of overuse (over-testing/treatment) and 
underuse (under-testing/treatment). We show that theory choice determines the “rational” course of 
action, both at the level of individual and policy decision-making.  
 Brief overview of principles and theories of rationality 
Rationality is commonly defined as decision-making that helps us achieve our goals.8,9 In the context 
of clinical medicine, this typically means the desire to improve our health. Rationality does not 
guarantee that a decision is error-free; rather, rational decision-making accounts for the potential 
consequences of possible errors of our action - false negatives and false positives - to help us arrive 





at optimal outcomes.  Theories of rationality for decision-making are broadly classified as descriptive 
theories (which depict how people actually make their decisions) and normative ones (addressing 
the question how people “should” or “ought to” make their decisions). In-between are prescriptive 
theories, which prescribe routes of action expected to be effective given what is known about human 
cognitive processes and cognitive architecture.10 Table 1 displays a short summary description of 
some of the most common theories of rationality relevant to clinical medicine. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the core ingredients that are common across most theoretical constructs of rationality.7 
We next illustrate the issues of overuse and underuse in medicine that can be observed under each 
of these theories.  Overuse refers to “too much care” and is defined as “provision of a service that is 
unlikely to increase the quality or quantity of life, that poses more harm than benefit, or that patients 
who were fully informed of its potential benefits and harms would not have wanted”; underuse refers 
to “too little care”, defined as “failure to deliver a service that is highly likely to improve the quality or 
quantity of life, that represents good value for the money, and that patients who were fully informed of 
its potential benefits and harms would have wanted”.11 Thus, both overuse and underuse are defined 
relative to the goals of the decision-maker – in this case, a fully-informed patient and his/her 
physician.  
Overuse and underuse under normative theories of decision-making 
Evidence-based Medicine (EBM) 
EBM represents the dominant mode of clinical practice today. EBM rationality rests on the link 
between taking action and believing what is true.12-14 That is, our actions and beliefs are justifiable 
(or, reasonable / rational) as a function of the trustworthiness of the evidence (evidentialism), and the 
extent to which we believe that evidence is determined by credible processes (reliabilism). 12-14 EBM 
posits that when evidence is of higher quality (i.e., it is closer to the “truth”) our estimates about 
benefits and harms are better calibrated.14 Under the premise that “rational people respect their 





evidence” 12,  EBM postulates that recommending tests or treatments when there is high quality of 
evidence in favor of their support is the most rational recommendation to make. Indeed, there is some 
evidence that the probability that guidelines panels will issue strong recommendations (for or against 
interventions) is much higher when the quality of the evidence is actually better.15,16 Thus, it appears 
that practitioners of EBM generally behave rationally. On the other hand, this EBM principle is not 
consistently followed: a study evaluating 456 recommendations made by 116 World Health 
Organization (WHO) guidelines panels found that about 55% of strong recommendations were based 
on low or very low quality evidence.17 People, including experts, are generally not skilled in 
distinguishing strong from weak evidence, an effect known as ‘meta-cognitive myopia’.18 In most 
cases, following these recommendations would result in overuse i.e., an irrational policy according to 
the EBM rationality standard. However, a number of justifications could explain the WHO panel 
recommendations, and this may make them rational under different rationality theories (see below, 
“Argumentative Theory of Reasoning/ Rationality”). 
An additional challenge for an EBM theory of rationality is that only about 20% of recommendations 
are based on consistent, high-quality evidence.19,20 In many cases, perhaps most, the 
recommendations cannot be made because of an absence of evidence. “Absence of evidence is, 
however, not evidence of absence”21 -- a lack of high-quality evidence does not mean that the 
intervention is not effective. This creates situations ripe for both underuse and overuse. The latter 
occur when clinicians use their uncontrolled experience or “best judgment” in the absence of 
empirical data.  However, most often the major government or professional organizations are 
reluctant to recommend interventions for which there is no reliable evidence of its beneficial effects. 
Thus, rational behavior according to EBM may lead primarily to underuse -- denying health 
interventions to those who may need it. 
 





Expected-utility based decision analysis 
Decision analysis is the second most commonly used normative theory in clinical medicine. It is 
typically used in cost-effectiveness analyses as well as to guide development of guidelines for 
practice.22,23  With respect to rationality, decision analysis is based on expected utility theory (EUT). 
According to EUT, when faced with several possible courses of actions, the rational decision is 
judged to be the one based on the selection of the alternative with highest expected utility – for 
instance, the one with the highest quality-adjusted life years. Note that EUT is the only known theory 
of choice that satisfies all the mathematical axioms of rational decision-making.7  
One of the major advances in the field of decision-making was the development of the so-called 
threshold model.24-26 The threshold mbodies a critical link between evidence (which exists on the 
continuum of credibility) and decision-making (which is a categorical exercise – we decide to act or 
not act).26 The threshold model stipulates that the most rational decision in medicine is to initiate an 
intervention when the expected benefits outweigh its expected harms at a given probability of disease 
or clinical outcome (Fig. 1a).24,25 Fig. 1a illustrates that, as the therapeutic benefit/harm ratio 
increases, the threshold probability at which treatment should be given is lowered.24,25 Conversely, if 
a treatment’s benefit/harm ratio is smaller, the threshold probability for therapeutic action will be 
higher.24,25 For example, Basinga and colleagues estimated that benefit/harm ratio of administering 
antituberculosis therapy to a patient with suspected tuberculosis (TB) is about 36 in terms of 
morbidity/mortality outcomes.27 This converts into a low threshold probability of about 2.7%.27 Thus, 
according to EUT, rational physicians should prescribe drugs against TB when the probability of TB 
exceeds 2.7%.27 At the probability of 2.7%, this means that the majority of patients suspected of 
having TB will actually not have tuberculosis. As a result, acting according to EUT, the normative 
theory widely accepted as the gold standard in medicine, will predictably lead to further increase (and 
resource waste) in the use of diagnostic and treatment interventions!26,28,29 This can hardly be 
considered a rational course of action. Note that because most evaluation of drug effects passes 





through the scrutiny of regulatory approval agencies such as FDA, they will be approved for use in 
practice only if the benefits outweigh the harms; similarly, most diagnostic tests are perceived as 
harmless. This means that overtesting and overtreatment is built into the EUT model. Underuse is 
also possible, but that usually occurs as a result of poorly calibrated prediction models that may 
(mis)estimate the probability of a disease/outcome to be below the threshold, when it is actually 
above the threshold. This is an epistemic (i.e., knowledge-related) issue caused by poor predictive 
evidence; it should be distinguished from the effects of emotions on estimates of probability and the 
consequences of decisions. As explained below, acting based on regret theory or a dual processing 
theory of rationality can modify an action threshold in a way that would appear more rational to a 
decision-maker. 
Overuse and underuse under descriptive theories of decision-making 
Interactionist or Argumentative Theory of Reasoning and Rationality 
The Interactionist or Argumentative Theory of Reasoning (ATR) proposes that people make decisions 
because they can find reasons to support them. People do not necessary favor the “best” decisions or 
decisions that satisfy some criterion of rationality, but decisions that are most (socially) acceptable, 
i.e., those that can be most easily justified to oneself and others and are less at risk of being 
criticized.30,31  The theory stipulates that reason and rational thinking has evolved with a primarily 
social function to justify oneself, to convince others to be believed, and to gain others’ trust (Table 
1).30,31  From the ATR perspective, it is easy to explain why conflicts of interest (COI) -- defined to 
exist “when professional judgment concerning a primary interest (such as patients' welfare or the 
validity of research) may be influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain or desire to 
avoid a lawsuit)”32-- are pervasive in medicine and difficult to eradicate. From the perspective of those 
to whom COI apply, such behaviour may be quite rational (if not necessarily moral). 





Similarly, in explaining the reasons why their strong recommendations were based on low- or very 
low-quality evidence, the WHO panel members17 gave a number of reasons for issuing such 
recommendations (see above).33  A typical reason for offering treatment was given as “avoiding 
underuse”, based on a conviction that a treatment is beneficial despite the fact that the panel made 
explicit ratings of the evidence quality as low or very low.33 Such a reason directly contradicts EBM 
principles of rationality.7,34  Another frequently given reason is a concern that policy-makers 
responsible for funding decisions will ignore recommendations that are insufficiently “strong”. In 
addition, WHO panelists sometimes feel wedded to long-established practices, and feel 
uncomfortable issuing any but strong recommendations regarding such practices.33 Importantly, as 
predicted by ATR, the reasons given by the panel members are not meant to satisfy a specific 
criterion of rationality, but to convince other panel members to “vote” in a similar way. Whether a 
particular recommendation would lead to overuse or underuse was rarely explicitly invoked.  
Emotions and Regret Theory of Rationality 
People’s decision-making often relies on emotions and intuition. Our feelings influence the way we 
perceive and process risks; this is known as the “risk as feelings” phenomena.35 Emotions lead to 
different ways in which probabilities and consequences of our actions (utilities) are evaluated. Affect-
rich situations may lead to probability neglect in which people are sensitive only to the presence or 
absence of stimuli, and recognize outcomes only as being possible or not36, while in affect-poor 
contexts, probabilities tend to be evaluated without such distortions.37,38 The “risk as feelings” 
phenomenon can influence the way physicians make their decisions. For example, Hemmerich et 
al.39 studied physicians who experienced negative emotions, such as having a patient die during 
“watchful waiting” for a small abdominal aortic aneurysm. They found that such physicians’ 
management of the subsequent patients would be significantly affected, to the point that they would 
accelerate the timing of surgery, even if this would contradict normative EBM guidelines. These 
physicians appear to aim to minimize their feelings of regret in the management of the next patient.39 





Regret is a cognitive emotion, which we are motivated to regulate to achieve our desired goals; many 
of our decisions are driven by the desire to avoid regret and minimize (perceived) risks.40,41 It has 
been argued that rational decision-making is associated with regret-averse decision processes,42-44 
particularly if the beneficial aspects of regret regulation, such as learning and explicitly considering 
the consequences of decision-making, are decoupled from the deleterious ones (e.g., self-blame, and 
self-reproach).45,46 Importantly, unlike normative models such as those based on decision analysis, 
regret takes context into account. When regret was taken into account, the threshold for giving 
treatment to a patient suspected of having TB dramatically increased (from 2.7% to 20-60%) (see Fig 
1b).27 The threshold model can also be reformulated accounting for regret.26,47-49  The model predicts 
drops in the threshold level if a decision-maker regrets failing to benefit more than they regret causing 
unnecessary harms. This possibly can lead to more false-positive decisions,50 resulting in 
overtreatment and overtesting as one would expect in the case of the management of an individual 
patient. Conversely, if regret of harms is felt to be higher than failing to benefit, the threshold will 
increase.26,47-49 Under these circumstances, fewer false positive decisions would be made, but more 
false negative ones would be made, resulting in more undertreatment and underdiagnosis.50 
Dual Process Theories of Cognition and Rationality 
Principle Number 3 states that rational thinking should be informed by human cognitive architecture 
(Table 2). According to dual process theories, human cognition can be thought of as a function of two 
types of processes: type 1 processes, characterized as “old mind” (affect-based, intuitive, fast, 
resource-frugal) and type 2, “new mind” processes (analytic, deliberative, consequential, 
effortful).9,51,52 In the setting of dual-processing architecture, it is important to realize that regret, as a 
cognitive emotion, is characterized by a counterfactual reasoning process: it operates imagining 
“what if” scenarios -- we  regret when we compare the actual outcome to what might have happened, 
but did not.40,41 In this respect, regret serves as a link between intuitive and effortful processes, 
providing a mechanism for a dual-process rationality model.7,53 The threshold model, which links the 





key features of clinical medicine: evidence with decision-making, has also been formulated within a 
framework of dual-processing theories.54 An empirical study testing prediction according to EUT 
versus regret theory versus a dual-processing threshold model showed that  the model based on 
dual-processing theory of decision-making provided the best explanation for the observed results.55 
This is likely because the model integrates regret, EUT and a switch between two cognitive domains 
that can explain how a decision-maker increases or decreases an action threshold as a function of 
interactions between type 1 and type 2 processes.54 For example, consistent with Hemmerich et al.39, 
the model postulates that a physician’s threshold will go up, if his/her recent experience was colored 
with emotions when h/she saw the next patient facing a similar decision. The threshold will go down if 
no emotion (including regret) had affected the physician’s perception of benefits and harms of health 
interventions.54 Rationality, according to dual processing theories, needs to take into account both 
analytical and affect-based reasoning.56 This might sound counter-intuitive at first, in that popular 
culture often contrasts emotionalism with rationality; however, without emotion we have no goals, and 
without goals there is no rationality.52 It is the regulation of emotions, particularly regret, which 
represents one of the key ingredients of rational behavior.57 Thus, according to dual processing 
theories of decision-making, incoherence between type 1 and type 2 processes can disrupt optimal 
decision-making, resulting in overuse or underuse as a function of their influence on the action 
threshold.26,28 This, as explained, may happen when research evidence on benefits and harms 
implies one course of action (e.g., treat at a lower probability of disease), but context, emotion or 
recent experiences indicate a different course of action (e.g., treat at a much higher probability of 
disease).39,54 
Theory of Bounded Rationality: Adaptive/Ecological Rationality 
Medical encounters increasingly occur within the setting of the limited time and in the context of the 
ongoing information explosion.58 A typical clinical encounter is approximately 11 minute long with less 
than 2 minutes available to search for reliable information, with interruptions occurring, on average, 





every 15 minutes.58 At the same time, more than 6 million articles are published in more than 20,000 
biomedical journals every year59, with MEDLINE alone containing over 22 million indexed citations 
from more than 5,600 journals.60  In addition, 75 randomized clinical trials and 11 systematic reviews 
are published every day.61 This information explosion needs to be contrasted with the human brain’s 
limited capacity for information processing, memory limitations, and relatively low storage capability.58 
The Theory of Bounded Rationality (which serves as the basis for Principle #4, Table 2) posits that 
rationality depends on the context, and should respect epistemological, environmental and 
computational constraints of human brains.7 Under the real-life complexity of the health care system 
and the limitations of human information processing, rational behavior relies on satisficing process 
(i.e., finding a good enough solution),7,58,62 instead of maximizing (i.e., finding the best possible 
solution).  
Satisficing is sometimes structured via heuristics, which represent mechanisms for implementing 
bounded rationality.63 Heuristics are widely used in medical education, as popular “mental shortcuts”, 
“rules of thumb”, clinical pathways and algorithms. The use of heuristics is defined as “a strategy 
that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, and/or 
accurately than more complex methods”64 and may sometimes outperform complex statistical 
models, in a phenomenon known as “less-is-more”.65   
The principle behind satisficing is that there must be a point (threshold) at which obtaining more 
information or computation becomes overly detrimental and costly; the use of heuristics helps the 
decision maker stop searching before this threshold has been crossed. 65 In clinical medicine, it is 
often implemented via fast-and-frugal trees (FFT), highly effective, simple decision trees composed of 
sequentially ordered cues (tests) and binary (yes/no) decisions formulated via a series of if-then 
statements.66 FFT can be linked to EUT and regret via the threshold model.66 A variant of satisficing 
known as “robust satisficing” is proposed to regulate regret42,43,57,  a concept similar to “acceptable 
regret”: we can rationally accept some losses without feeling regret.48,49 “Acceptable regret” is shown 





to explain both underuse and overuse when compared against deviations from normative 
standards.48,49 It explains why the “stubborn quest for diagnostic certainty”67, that is, overtesting in the 
face of already sufficient evidence, widely considered to be one of the main culprits of increasing 
health care costs, may not be irrational.29,48,49,68 For example, in an end-of-life setting, patients would 
accept a potentially wrong referral to hospice, only if the estimated probability of death within 6 
months exceeded 96%. That is, they would accept hospice care without regretting it only if they are 
virtually certain that death is imminent.68  This may explain why dying patients are consistently 
referred to hospice very late, typically averaging less than 1 week before dying.69  
Deontic Introduction Rationality: Linking the Rationality of “Is” with the Rationality of “Ought” 
We have consistently referred to the essence of clinical practice as the integration of empirical 
evidence with categorical actions (yes/no) that fundamentally defines decision-making. In a medical 
context, rationality requires integration of evidence related to the problem at hand (“is”, which is 
derived from our observations) with the goals and values of decisions and (potential) actions 
(“ought”) (Principles #1 & #2, Table 2). It is these rationally-guided ought decisions that allows us to 
achieve our goals. We referred to the threshold model of decision-making as a model that serves as a 
link between evidence and decision-making.26 Recently, Deontic Introduction Theory was 
developed70,71 to provide psychological mechanisms for how normative (a.k.a. ‘deontic’) rules for 
actions can be generated by linking empirical evidence to values and the transference of value from 
goals to actions.70,71 Interestingly, there seems to be an evolutionary background for both the need for 
reliable evidence to help us function in our environment,72,73 and for the generation of normative 
“ought” or “should” rules (“Faced with the knowledge that there are hungry children in Somalia, we 
easily and naturally infer that we ought to donate to famine relief charities”).70 Physicians seem to 
generate deontic “ought” or “should” rules routinely. They first link evidence with outcomes to create 
explanations in terms of causation (“If you smoke, you will likely get lung cancer”). They then infer 
values from outcomes (“Lung cancer is an undesirable outcome”, therefore, “Smoking is bad”), which 





in turn results in value transference from goals to actions to create a normative conclusion (“You 
should not smoke”). The action rules thus created reflect pragmatic rationality that involves 
instrumental “oughts”. (Note that instrumental “oughts” should not be confused with evaluative 
“oughts”, which reflects overall value judgments such as moral judgments).74  The former are typically 
accurate within a specific setting, constituting if-then rules, while the latter aim at universally valid 
statements (even though they often cannot be separated from the context). So, acting on normative 
conclusions frequently seen in oncology practice such as, “Given that the diagnosis of metastatic 
cancer is made, the patient ought to be treated with chemotherapy,” can be rational in one setting, but 
irrational in another.  This can result either in overtreatment of futile therapy, as is often observed in 
the end-of-life setting,75 or undertreatment, as in cases when treatment is inappropriately denied 
based on an arbitrary (usually older) age or due to “excessively high” costs. 
Deontic Introduction Theory emphasizes the crucial role of context in generating normative rules for 
guiding behavior. Context defines the goals of the individual as well as their beliefs in how to cause 
them to materialize. According to grounded rationality76 (Table 1), the rational course of action 
represents the action aimed to achieve our goals as a function of epistemic context – the evidence 
and knowledge available to us at the time of making such decisions. Such epistemic context is 
subject to cognitive variability, that is, the individual and cultural characteristics of the decision maker. 
For example, decisions on opting for palliative care are sensitive to cultural and individual values.77 
This again serves to underline our thesis that no single theory of rationality can fit all decision makers 
in all contexts. What might be rational for a specific context, may not be rational in a different context, 










Rationality revolves around finding the most effective procedures to achieve our goals.7 As “no one 
size model fits all” clinical circumstances,7 these goals may be differently, but correctly, pursued and 
achieved under different theories of rationality. Purely normative models can often be off the mark as 
they rely on mathematical abstractions, whereas prescriptive models of rationality10 aim to realize 
rational solutions by relying on the accumulated knowledge of human cognitive architecture, and 
make recommendations accordingly. We propose that prescriptive rational models in clinical decision 
making should also make use of whichever model best fits a specific context. For example, 
operational achievements of the goals in health care can be realized by linking evidence with 
decisions via the threshold model.26 According to the threshold model, rational decision-making 
consists of prescribing treatment or ordering a test when the benefits of treatment exceeds its harms 
for given probability of disease or clinical outcome.26 However, thresholds can vary as a function of 
different contextual factors that play roles in some theories of decision-making and not in others 26. As 
a result, what is defined as rational or irrational actions resulting in overuse or underuse is inextricably 
intertwined with whatever theoretical frameworks within which these decisions are considered. That 
is, rational behavior under one theory may be irrational under a different viewpoint.  
One of the fundamental challenges for medical decision-making is that goals often conflict and that 
rational attempts to achieve one goal may prevent achieving another. According to Stanovich,44 
rationality means achieving a coherence among goals, and we need to rely on both normative and 
descriptive procedures to coherently integrate across goals. This is known as meta-rationality44-- 
asking reflectively about the appropriateness of our emotional reactions to a decision. “The trick may 
be to value formal principles of rationality, but not to take them too seriously”.44 
However, coherent integration of goals may sometimes be impossible. For example, we may have a 
rational goal to extend a patient’s life, but resource use may exceed what is affordable. That is, 





decision-makers often face a trade-off between goals and interests of individuals and the wider 
society, pitching duty-bound, deontological decisions against the utilitarian ethics. These goals are 
often expressed in terms of “value”, where “value” is defined as equivalent to clinical benefit/cost 
ratio. Formally, the most common metric to gauge the “right” value for health care is to calculate the 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER) among competing health interventions [ICER=(cost1-
cost2)/(effectiveness1-effectiveness2)]. Typically, effectiveness is expressed as the quality life-
adjusted years (QALY) gained for determining whether a given health intervention is considered 
beneficial. What is acceptable according to ICER depends on a particular society, which may decide 
not to offer a particular treatment or a diagnostic test if the societally-agreed upon ICER threshold is 
exceeded. In the US, for example, the generally acceptable ICER threshold is between $50K to 
$200K/QALY.78 In contrast, the World Health Organization (WHO) considers an intervention to be 
cost-effective if the cost of the intervention per disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) averted is less than 
three times the country’s annual GDP per capita.79 Using a different definition, and neglecting 
relevant context such as the disease burden and the available budget, may result in a paradoxical -- 
and seemingly irrational -- allocation of a country’s health budget, as demonstrated by Marseille et al. 
in their analysis of the WHO ICER thresholds.79  Fundamentally, all these initiatives expose tensions 
between societal vs. individual interests.50 Interestingly,  testing of the role of Deontic Introduction in 
moral inference found that the tendency to infer normative conclusions mostly coheres with utilitarian 
(rather than deontological) judgments71, which can explain increasing outrage over ever-increasing 
health care costs.80 
Another example of a goal conflict, one which all too often leads to “overtreatment” with aggressive 
therapy rather than a more appropriate palliative approach such as hospice, is the end-of-life setting. 
The usual goal for medical decision-making is to improve health, but what are appropriate goals at 
the end-of-life? A “good death” is not “better health” in the usual sense, yet it can be rationally 
accepted, most importantly at the level of intrinsic emotional peace. A theoretic approach to rational 





decision making must accommodate this goal. Here again, invoking regret may prove the mechanism 
allowing the peaceful exit that many humans typically desire. Consistent with Aristotle's “dead bed 
test” of no regret – life lived with no unfulfilled potentials weighing on our souls – it was found that 
elicitation of regret can actually improve decision-making at the end of life.81 Thus, rational decision-
making has to take into account both analytical and affect-based reasoning.  
A “unifying theory of rationality” is likely not possible, particularly because decision-making is 
extremely context-sensitive (and, as explained, normative theories typically fail to take context into 
account).7 We also believe that context-setting is a prerequisite to a rational approach to both 
practical and theoretical considerations to problem-solving and decision-making. How a given clinical 
problem should be approached is ultimately an empirical question. By calling for “normative pluralism” 
and pragmatic rationality, according to which the context and the clinical situation should be matched 
to a contextually-appropriate theory of rationality, we believe that the current unsatisfactory situation 
in health care could dramatically improve. Although this position incorporates an element of 
relativism, by acknowledging contextual dependence, it is a moderate type of relativism rather than a 
stronger ‘anything goes’ version.82,83 
Our paper also has important practical implications. Physicians are increasingly paid according to the 
quality of care they deliver and penalized for overuse/underuse.84 What our analysis shows is that 
these policy initiatives cannot be devoid of the theoretical rationality framework in which quality 
improvement assessments operate. Financing of healthcare services, which is increasingly being 
proposed to be a function of the measurement of over- and underuse of health services, should be 
determined based on the choice of theoretical framework. 
We believe that an attempt to define theoretical framework(s) to measure appropriateness of care is 
what is largely missing in the current discussion of over-and underuse of care. Even though both 





over- and underuse are widely acknowledged as an empirical phenomena in modern health care,11,85-
88 actual measurement of over- and underuse has been difficult to achieve.85,86  
Two methodological approaches have dominated measurements of over- and underuse: 1) 
comparing the use of health care services against some sort of pre-defined “truth” or “gold standard”; 
2) detecting unexpectedly wide variations in the delivery of health-care services.85,86 The first 
approach relies on a “correspondence theory of truth”, which assumes that there is “objective reality”  
and that “truth” is based on the correspondence of ideas, concepts, and theories with facts.89,90 This 
typically takes a form of measuring outcomes against evidence-based guidelines. However, as 
discussed above, evidence is often challenged and finding an incontrovertible “truth” that is uniformly 
accepted is, in practice, extremely difficult, perhaps impossible. One possible solution is by seeking 
correspondence with the goals of the d cision-maker (rather than with an “objective truth” outside the 
decision-maker), as argued above. 
The second approach, which measures over- and underuse by assessing (surprisingly wide) 
variations in care, relies on the “coherence theory of truth”, according to which statements or 
judgments are “true” if they cohere with other judgments or statements.89,90 Thus, it is assumed that 
similar patients in similar conditions in similar settings should be managed similarly, with minimal 
variation. This approach is typically based on the analysis of practice patterns from large data-
sets,76,77 and fundamentally disregards individual patients’ circumstances and their values and 
preferences. For example, use of more medicalized terminology in discussions with patients often 
leads to more aggressive treatment and overuse.91 In this sense, coherence is often used to define 
“rationality”- given the premises, certain conclusions should be necessarily drawn if a rational 
reasoning process is followed. However, deductive argument validity only guarantees rational 
conclusions given rational premises, which is not necessarily always the case. If the premises are 
false, even if the reasoning is valid, the conclusion will also be false. In contrast, correspondence is 





concerned with the accuracy of judgments or claims against some criterion of accuracy,89,90 which 
makes it potentially more useful for rationality in clinical decision making.  
Ultimately, both measurement and mitigations of over- and underuse will not improve until they are 
placed within a better framework of rationality theories.89,90 Although there are many theories of truth, 
broadly speaking, normative theories of rationality reflect the coherence theory of truth, while 
descriptive theries of rationality tend to rely on the correspondence theory of truth. As we stress 
above, different medical problems will require different theoretical approaches.  In our view, further 
advances in health care, including reducing the rates of over-and underuse, will only be possible with 
an explicit identification of the theoretical framework from which the problem is addressed. 
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Table 1 A list of major theories and models of rationality relevant to medical decision-making7 
Normative Theories of Rationality 
Evidence-based Medicine approach to rational decision-making:
12,14
 a normative theory, which posits that there is a link between rationality and 
believing what is true. [Our actions and beliefs are justifiable (or, reasonable/rational) as a function of the trustworthiness of the evidence, and the 
extent to which we believe that evidence is determined by credible processes]. See also: epistemic rationality 




Epistemic rationality: The rationality based on acquisition of true / fit-for-purpose knowledge. Linked to new mind rationality52 (see also Grounded 
Rationality). 
Example: Evidence-based medicine approach to decision-making. 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) - Decision analysis / Bayesian rationality: 
93
 The type of rationality associated with conformity to a normative 
standard such as the probability calculus or classical logic. In medicine, the most dominant normative theory is EUT, which is based on mathematical 
axioms of rationality, according to which rational choice is associated with selection of the alternative with higher expected utility (Expected utility is 
the average of all possible results weighted by their  corresponding probabilities). It is typically based on Bayesian probability calculus.*  
Example: decision analyses such as EUT-based micro simulation model to develop screening recommendations for colorectal cancer.
23
 
Descriptive Theories of Rationality 
Pragmatic/instrumental rationality/ rationality1
8
  or substantive rationality:
42,43 a descriptive theory, which proposes that rationality depends on 
the content and not only on the structure of decisions (process), and that the content should be assessed in light of short- and long-term goals 
(purpose). Fits with the Descriptivist approach74 which argues that empirical evidence cannot support the ‘oughtness’ of a model. 
Adaptive or Ecological Rationality:
64,65 a variant of bounded rationality, which stipulates that human decision-making depends on the context and 
environmental cues; hence, rational behavior/decision-making requires adaptation to environment / patient circumstances. Sometimes referred to as 
‘Panglossian’9,94, the position that humans should be considered to be a priori rational due to optimal evolutionary processes. 
Example: Extrapolation of research evidence to specific patient circumstances including social context, co-morbidities, etc dominates medical 
practice 
Argumentative Theory of Reasoning
30,31 proposes that reason and rational thinking has evolutionary evolved with primary social function to justify 
one’s self and convince others to believe one and gain their trust. 
Example: Doctors invoke evidence-based knowledge out of sense that it would be approved by the medical community and, in doing so, preserve 
their reputation and improve the health of their patients. 
Bounded Rationality:62,95 posits that, reflective of the principle that rationality should respect epistemological, environmental and computational 
constraints of human brains, rational behavior relies on satisficing process (finding a good enough solution) instead of EUT maximizing approach. 
The heuristic approach to decision-making is the mechanism of implementation of bounded rationality.63 Often linked to prescriptive models of 
rationality96, designs for improvement of human rationality informed by cognitive architecture.  
Example: Simple fast-and-frugal tree using readily available clinical cues outperformed 50 variables multivariable logistic model regarding decision 
whether to admit the patient with chest pain to coronary care unit.
65 
Deontic Introduction Theory:70 a descriptive theory of inference from “Is” to “Ought”, which implies that rationality requires integration of the 
evidence related to the problem at hand  (“Is”) with the goals and values to decisions and actions (“Ought”), while taking context into account. See 
also: Grounded Rationality. 
Example: Evidence (‘Is”) shows that if prostate cancer patients receive detailed information about hormone therapy, their decision making style 
improves; policy makers infer that patients should receive detailed information.
97 
Dual processing theories of rational thought (DPTRT):9 a family of theories based on the architecture of human cognition, contrasting intuitive 
(“type 1”) processes with effortful (“type 2”) processes. A descriptive variant of this approach is that the rational action should be coherent with formal 
principles of rationality as well as human intuitions about good decisions. The normative / prescriptive variant of this theory is sometimes referred to 
as ‘Meliorism’9,94, the position that humans are often irrational but can be educated to be rational. According to Meliorist principles, when the goals of 
the genes clash with the goals of the individual (see below), the rational course of action should be dictated by the latter.  
Example: Physicians often adjust their recommendations based on their intuition.
98
 
DPTRT can be thought of as a combination / contrast of: 
Old mind / Evolutionary rationality / rationality of the genes
52,99
: The rationality linked to evolutionarily-instilled goals (sex, hunger, etc.). Past-
oriented and relying on type 1 mechanisms, it is driven by the evolutionary past and by experiential learning 
Example: Eating chocolates when one has to reduce weight. 
New mind / Individual rationality
52,99
. The rationality linked to the goals of the individual rather than those of the genes. It is future-oriented and 
relies on type 2 mechanisms, most importantly the ability to run mental simulations of future events and hypothetical situations. This is what enables 
humans to think consequentially and solve novel problems 
Example: Use of contraceptives. The genes’ goal is to self-replicate, i.e. to produce more copies of themselves. Contraceptives negate this goal while 
allowing humans greater individual freedom.   
Grounded Rationality:
76
 a descriptive theory, which postulates that rationality should be judged within epistemic context (i.e., what is known to a 
decision-maker and his / her goals), and that rational course of action is the one that facilitates the achievement of our goals given the context. See 
also Pragmatic Rationality. 
Example: To achieve health goals, physicians typically recommend treatment with which they are familiar / know about. 
Meta-rationality
44 or the Master rationality Motive:100 relies on DPTRT, and posits that rationality represents hierarchical goal integration while 
taking into account both emotions and reasons. It also refers to integration of so called Thin theories of rationality: Theories in which the goals, 
context and desires of behavior are not evaluated (as per ,for example, applying EUT without taking patient’s desires into account) – that is, any goal 
is as good as any other goal -- with  Broad theories of rationality: Theories of rationality in which the goals and desires of the decision maker are 
evaluated within context and in such a way as to achieve hierarchical coherence within goals.99,101 
Example: Meta-rationality model of rationality subsumes other variants of DPTRT. The approach based on meta-rationality is often characteristic of a 
“wise” physician; the approach is particularly evident in high-stake, high-emotional decisions such as end-of-life where the substantive goals about 
achievable health status have to be reconciled with patient / physician emotional reaction to a proposed decision 
Example: Pragmatic rationality dominates clinical decision-making particularly in the fields such as oncology, where desirable health goals (e.g., cure) 
may not be possible; as a result, the re-evaluation of both goals and decision procedures may be needed (e.g., switch from aggressive treatment to 
palliative care in advanced incurable cancers, etc.) 
Regret regulation-rationality is characterized by regulation of regret:57 This is a variant of DPTRT that relies on regret, which as a cognitive 
emotion uses counterfactual reasoning processes to tap into the analytical aspect of our cognitive architecture as well as into affect-based decision-





making. According to this view, medical rational decision-making is associated with regret-averse decision processes. 
Example: Contemporary medical practice has increasingly adopted the practice that patients’ values and preferences should be consulted before a 
given health intervention is given. Patient values and preferences heavily depend on emotions such as regret, which, if properly elicited, may improve 
vigilance in decision-making. 
40,41,81
 
Robust satisficing:42,43 a variant of regret-based DPTRT, according to which the rational course of action is to “maximize confidence in a good 
enough outcome even if the things go poorly” (instead of maximizing EUT) ; the conceptis similar to “acceptable regret” 48,49 hypothesis of rational 
decision-making, which postulates that we can rationally accept some losses without feeling regret. 
Example: Annual screening mammography over 10 years in women older than 50 will prevent 1 death per 1,000  from breast cancer but at cost of 
50-200 unnecessary false alarms and 2-10 unnecessary breast removals.
102
 When it comes to decisions like these, which are value- and emotionally- 




Threshold model of rational action proposes that the most rational decision is to prescribe treatment or order a diagnostic test when the expected 
treatment benefit outweighs its expected harms at a given probability of disease or clinical outcome.26 It has been formulated within EUT24,25, dual 
processing theories54 and regret framework.26,28,48,49 
Example: see text and Fig. 1 
 
  






Table 2 Core ingredients (“Principles”) of rationality commonly identified across theoretical models7 
P1: Most major theories of choice agree that rational decision-making requires integrations of 
• Benefits (gains) 
• Harms (losses)  
in order to fulfill our goals (e.g., better health) 
P2: It typically occurs under conditions of uncertainty 
• rational approach requires reliable evidence to deal with the inherent uncertainties 
• relies on cognitive processes that allow integration of probabilities / uncertainties 
P3: Rational thinking should be informed by human cognitive architecture  
• it is composed of type 1 reasoning processes, which characterizes  “old mind” (affect-based, intuitive, 
fast, resource-frugal) and type 2 processes (analytic and deliberative, consequentially-driven, and 
effortful) of the “new mind” 
P4: Rationality depends on the context and should respect epistemological, environmental and computational 
constraints on human brains  
P5: Rationality (in medicine) is closely linked to ethics and morality of our actions 
• it requires consideration of utilitarian (society-oriented), duty-bound (individual-oriented) and rights-
based (autonomy, “no decision about me, without me”) ethics 
 
  






Figure 1. Threshold model of decision-making. A) The model states that the most rational decision is 
to prescribe treatment when the expected treatment benefit outweighs its expected harms at given 
probability of disease or clinical outcome. The horizontal line indicates the probability at which 
physicians should treat the patient with suspected tuberculosis (2.7%). B) Actual threshold for treating 
a patient suspected of having tuberculosis (based on Basinga et al27; graph: courtesy of Dr. Jef Van 
den Ende(see Table 1 and text for details) 
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In spite of enormous spending and resource utilization, today's health care remains characterized by 
poor health outcomes in large part due to overuse (over-testing/treatment) or underuse (under-
testing/treatment) of interventions. To a significant extent, this is a consequence of low-quality 
decision-making that appears to violate various rationality criteria. Such sub-optimal decision-making 
is considered a leading cause of death and is responsible for more than 80% health expenses. In this 
paper, we address the issue of overuse or underuse of healthcare interventions from the perspective 
of rational choice theory. We show that what is rational under one decision theory may not be rational 
under a different theory. We posit that the questions and concerns regarding both underuse and 
overuse has to be addressed within a specific theoretical framework. The applicable rationality 
criterion, and thus the “appropriateness” of health care delivery choices, depends on theory selection 
that is appropriate to specific clinical situations. We provide a number of illustrations to show how the 
choice of theoretical framework determines both our policy and individual decision-making. We also 
highlight the practical implications of our analysis in relation to the current efforts to measure the 













It is no secret that todays’ health care is in crisis1,2: societies devote enormous amount of resources 
to health care, and yet patient health outcomes remain inferior. The US alone spends nearly 18% 
($3.2 trillion) of its gross domestic product (GDP) on healthcare; however, only 55% of needed 
services are delivered and more than 30% is inappropriate, and therefore, wasteful, “care”.3 
Ultimately, the observed (suboptimal) care relates to the quality of medical decisions.3 Indeed, it has 
been contended that personal decisions are the leading cause of death4, and that physicians’ 
decisions are responsible for 80% of  healthcare expenditures.5,6 If decision-making can largely 
explain the relatively poor state of affairs of current health care utilization, the logical question to ask 
is: Are the decisions made during doctor-patient encounters, in fact, rational?  In a recent paper, we 
reviewed existing theories of rationality and their implications for medical practice.7 We found that no 
single model of rationality can fit all medical contexts; what is considered “rational behavior” under 
one rationality theory may be considered “irrational” under another one.7 We call this “normative 
pluralism”, which, as explained in detail below, calls for the matching of a given clinical 
situation/problem with a given theory of rationality. 
In this paper, we extend this analysis of rational decision-making in clinical medicine to demonstrate 
the practical importance of this debate on the question of overuse (over-testing/treatment) and 
underuse (under-testing/treatment). We show that theory choice determines the “rational” course of 
action, both at the level of individual and policy decision-making.  
 Brief overview of principles and theories of rationality 
Rationality is commonly defined as decision-making that helps us achieve our goals.8,9 In the context 
of clinical medicine, this typically means the desire to improve our health. Rationality does not 
guarantee that a decision is error-free; rather, rational decision-making accounts for the potential 
consequences of possible errors of our action - false negatives and false positives - to help us arrive 
at optimal outcomes.  Theories of rationality for decision-making are broadly classified as descriptive 





theories (which depict how people actually make their decisions) and normative ones (addressing 
the question how people “should” or “ought to” make their decisions). In-between are prescriptive 
theories, which prescribe routes to action expected to be effective given what is known about human 
cognitive processes and cognitive architecture.10 Table 1 displays a short summary description of 
some of the most common theories of rationality relevant to clinical medicine. Table 2 provides an 
overview of the core ingredients of rationality that are common across most theoretical constructs of 
rationality.7 We next illustrate the issues of overuse and underuse in medicine that can be observed 
under each of these theories.  Overuse refers to “too much care” and is defined as “provision of a 
service that is unlikely to increase the quality or quantity of life, that poses more harm than benefit, or 
that patients who were fully informed of its potential benefits and harms would not have wanted”; 
underuse refers to “too little care”, defined as “failure to deliver a service that is highly likely to 
improve the quality or quantity of life, that represents good value for money, and that patients who 
were fully informed of its potential benefits and harms would have wanted”.11 Thus, both over- and 
under-use are defined relative to the goals of the decision-maker – in this case, a fully-informed 
patient and his/her physician.  
Overuse and underuse under normative theories of decision-making 
Evidence-based Medicine 
Evidence-based medicine (EBM) represents the dominant mode of clinical practice today. EBM 
rationality rests on the link between taking action and believing what is true.12-14 That is, our actions 
and beliefs are justifiable (or, reasonable/rational) as a function of the trustworthiness of the evidence 
(evidentialism), and the extent to which we believe that evidence is determined by credible processes 
(reliabilism). 12-14 EBM posits that when evidence is of higher quality (i.e., it is closer to the “truth”) our 
estimates about benefits and harms are better calibrated. Under the premise that “rational people 
respect their evidence” 13,  EBM assumes that recommending tests or treatments when there is high 





quality of evidence in favor of their support is the most rational recommendation to make.12 Indeed, 
there is some evidence that the probability that guidelines panels will issue strong recommendations 
(for or against interventions) is much higher when the quality of the evidence is higher.15,16 Thus, it 
appears that practitioners of EBM generally behave rationally. On the other hand, this EBM principle 
is not consistently followed: a study evaluating 456 recommendations made by 116 World Health 
Organization (WHO) guidelines panels found that about 55% of strong recommendations were based 
on low or very low quality evidence.17 People, including experts, are generally not skilled in 
distinguishing strong from weak evidence, an effect known as ‘meta-cognitive myopia’.18 In most 
cases, following these recommendations would result in overuse i.e., an irrational policy according to 
the EBM rationality standard. However, a number of reasons could explain the WHO panel 
recommendations which makes them rational under different rationality theories (see below, 
“Argumentative Theory of Reasoning/ Rationality”). 
An additional challenge for an EBM theory of rationality is that only about 20% of recommendations 
are based on consistent, high-quality evidence.19,20 In many cases, perhaps most, the 
recommendations cannot be made because of an absence of evidence. “Absence of evidence is, 
however, not evidence of absence”21 - a lack of high-quality evidence does not mean that the 
intervention is not effective. This creates situations ripe for both underuse and overuse. The latter 
occur when clinicians use their uncontrolled experience or “best judgment” in the absence of 
empirical data.  However, most often the major government or professional organizations are 
reluctant to recommend interventions for which there is no reliable evidence of its beneficial effects. 
Thus, rational behavior according to EBM may lead primarily to underuse -- denying health 
interventions to those who may need it. 
Expected-utility based decision analysis 





Decision analysis is the second most commonly used normative theory in clinical medicine. It is 
typically used in cost-effectiveness analyses as well as to guide development of guidelines for 
practice.22,23  With respect to rationality, decision analysis is based on expected utility theory (EUT). 
According to EUT, when faced with several possible courses of actions, the rationality of a decision is 
judged to be the one based on selection of the alternative with higher expected utility – for instance, 
the one with higher quality-adjusted life years. Note that EUT is the only theory of choice that satisfies 
all the mathematical axioms of rational decision-making.7  
One of the major advances in the field of decision-making was the development of the so-called 
threshold model.24-26 The threshold embodies a critical link between evidence (which exists on the 
continuum of credibility) and decision-making (which is a categorical exercise – we decide to act or 
not act).26 The threshold model stipulat s that the most rational decision in medicine is to initiate an 
intervention when the expected benefit outweighs its expected harms at a given probability of disease 
or clinical outcome (Fig 1a).24,25 Fig 1a illustrates that, as the therapeutic benefit/harm ratio increases, 
the threshold probability at which treatment should be given is lowered.24,25 Conversely, if a 
treatment’s benefit/harm ratio is smaller, the threshold probability for therapeutic action will be 
higher.24,25 For example, Basinga and colleagues estimated that benefit/harm ratio of administering 
antituberculosis therapy to a patient with suspected tuberculosis (TB) is about 36 in terms of 
morbidity/mortality outcomes.27 This converts into the low threshold probability of about 2.7%.27 Thus, 
according to EUT, rational physicians should prescribe drugs against TB when the probability of TB 
exceeds 2.7%. 27 At the probability of 2.7%, this means that the majority of patients suspected of 
having TB will actually not have tuberculosis. As a result, acting according to EUT, the normative 
theory widely accepted as the gold standard in medicine, will predictably lead to further increase (and 
waste) in the use of diagnostic and treatment interventions!26,28,29 This can hardly be considered a 
rational course of action. Note that because most evaluation of drugs effects passes through the 
scrutiny of the regulatory approval agencies such as FDA, they will be approved for use in practice 





only if benefits outweigh harms; similarly, most diagnostic tests are perceived as harmless. This 
means that over-testing and overtreatment is built into the EUT model. Underuse is also possible, but 
that usually occurs as a result of poorly calibrated prediction models that may (mis)estimate the 
probability of a disease/outcome to be below the threshold, when it is actually above the threshold. 
This is an epistemic (i.e., knowledge-related) issue due to poor predictive evidence and should be 
distinguished from the effects of emotions on estimates of probability and the consequences of 
decisions, as further detailed below. As explained below, acting based on regret theory or dual 
processing theory of rationality can modify an action threshold in a way that would appear more 
rational to a decision-maker. 
Overuse and underuse under descriptive theories of decision-making 
Interactionist or Argumentative Theory of Reasoning and Rationality 
Interactionist or Argumentative Theory of Reasoning (ATR) proposes that people make decisions 
because they can find reasons to support them. They do not necessary favor the “best” decisions or 
decisions that satisfy some criterion of rationality, but decisions that are most (socially) acceptable, 
i.e., those that can be most easily justified and are less at risk of being criticized.30,31  The theory 
stipulates that reason and rational thinking has evolved with a primarily social function to justify 
oneself, to convince others to be believed, and to gain their trust (Table 1).30,31  From the ART 
perspective, it is easy to explain why conflict of interests - defined to exist “when professional 
judgment concerning a primary interest (such as patients' welfare or the validity of research) may be 
influenced by a secondary interest (such as financial gain or desire to avoid a lawsuit)”32- are 
pervasive in medicine and difficult to eradicate. From the perspective of those to whom conflict of 
interests apply, such behaviour may be quite rational (if not necessarily moral). 
Similarly, in explaining the reasons why their strong recommendations were based on low or very 
quality evidence, the WHO panel members17 gave a number of reasons for issuing such 





recommendations (see above).33  A typical reason for offering treatment was given as “avoiding 
underuse”, based on a conviction that a treatment is beneficial despite the fact that the panel made 
explicit ratings of the evidence quality as low or very low33 -- directly contradicting EBM principles of 
rationality.7,12  Another frequent reason given is a concern that policy-makers responsible for funding 
decisions will ignore recommendations that are not sufficiently “strong”. In addition, WHO panelists 
sometimes feel wedded to long-established practices, and feel uncomfortable issuing any but strong 
recommendations regarding such practices.33 Importantly, as predicted by ART, the reasons given by 
the panel members are n t meant to satisfy a specific criterion of rationality, but to convince other 
panel members to “vote” in a similar way. Whether a particular recommendation would lead to 
overuse or underuse was rarely explicitly invoked.  
Emotions and Regret Theory of Rationality 
People’s decision-making often relies on emotions and intuition. Our feelings influence the way we 
perceive and process risks; this is known as the “risk as feeling” phenomena.34 Emotions lead to 
different ways in which probabilities and consequences of our actions (utilities) are evaluated. Affect-
rich situations may lead to probability neglect in which people are sensitive only to the presence or 
absence of stimuli, and recognize outcomes only as being possible or not 35, while in affect-poor 
contexts, probabilities tend to be evaluated without such distortions.36,37 The “risk as feelings” 
phenomenon does frequently influence the way physicians make their decisions. For example, 
Hemmerich et al.38 demonstrated that if physicians experienced negative emotions, such as having a 
patient die during “watchful waiting” for a small abdominal aortic aneurysm, their management of the 
subsequent patients would be significantly affected to the point that they would accelerate the timing 
of surgery, even if this would not be in agreement with normative EBM guidelines. These physicians 
appear to aim to minimize their regret in the management of the next patient.38 





Regret is a cognitive emotion, which we are motivated to regulate to achieve our desired goals; many 
of our decisions are driven by the desire to avoid regret and minimize risks.39,40 It has been argued 
that rational decision-making is associated with regret-averse decision processes,41-43 particularly if 
the beneficial aspects of regret regulation, such as learning and explicitly considering the 
consequences of decision-making, are decoupled from the deleterious ones (e.g., self-blame, and 
self-reproach).44,45 Importantly, unlike normative models such as those based on decision analysis, 
regret takes context into account. When regret was taken into account, the threshold for giving 
treatment to a patient suspected of having TB dramatically increased (from 2.7% to 20-60%) (see Fig 
1b).27 The threshold model can also be reformulated via regret.26,46-48  The model predicts drops in 
the threshold level if a decision-maker regrets failing to benefit more than they regret causing 
unnecessary harms. This possibly can lead to more false-positive decisions,49 resulting in 
overtreatment and over-testing as one would expect in the case of the management of an individual 
patient. Conversely, if regret of harms is felt to be higher than failing to benefit, the threshold will 
increase.26,46-48 Under these circumstances, few false positive decisions would be made, but at the 
expense of false negative decisions resulting in more under-treatment and under-diagnosis.49 
Dual Process Theories of Cognition and Rationality 
Principle Number 3 states that rational thinking should be informed by human cognitive architecture 
(Table 2). According to dual process theories, human cognition can be thought of as a function of two 
types of processes: type 1 processes, characterized as  “old mind” (affect-based, intuitive, fast, 
resource-frugal) and type 2 processes (analytic, deliberative, consequential, effortful) of “new mind”. 
9,50,51 In the setting of dual-processing architecture, it is important to realize that regret, as a cognitive 
emotion, is characterized by a counterfactual reasoning process: it operates using “what if” scenarios 
-- we  regret when we compare the actual outcome to what might have happened, but did not.39,40 In 
this respect, regret serves as a link between intuitive and effortful processes, providing a mechanism 
for dual process rationality model.7,52 The threshold model, which links the key features of clinical 





medicine: evidence with decision-making, has also been formulated within a framework of dual 
processing theories.53 An empirical study testing prediction according to EUT vs. regret vs. dual 
processing threshold model showed that  the model based on dual-processing theory of decision-
making provided the best explanation for the observed results.54 This is probably because the model 
integrates regret, EUT and a switch between two cognitive domains that can explain how a decision-
maker increases or decreases an action threshold as a function of interactions between types 1 and 
type 2 processes.53 For example, consistent with Hemmerich et al.38, the model postulates that the 
threshold will go up if a physicians’ recent experience was colored with emotions when h/she saw the 
next patient facing a similar decision. The threshold will go down if no emotion (including regret) had 
affected the physician’s perception of benefit and harms of health interventions. 53 Rationality 
according to dual processing theories needs to take into account both analytical and affect-based 
reasoning.55 This might sound counter-intuitive at first, in that popular culture often contrasts 
emotionality with rationality; however, without emotion we have no goals, and without goals there is 
no rationality51. It is the regulation of emotions, particularly regret, which represents one of the key 
ingredients of rational behavior.56 Thus, according to dual processing theories of decision-making, 
incoherence between type 1 and type 2 processes can disrupt optimal decision-making, resulting in 
overuse or underuse as a function of their influence on the action threshold.26,28 This, as explained, 
may happen when research evidence on benefits and harms implies one course of action (e.g., treat 
at a lower probability of disease), but context, emotion or recent experiences indicate a different 
course of action (e.g, treat at a much higher probability of disease).38,53 
Theory of Bounded Rationality: Adaptive/Ecological Rationality 
Medical encounters occur within the setting of the limited time and in the context of the ongoing 
information explosion.57 A typical clinical encounter is about 11 minute long with less than 2 minutes 
available to search for reliable information, with interruptions occurring, on average, every 15 
minutes.57 At the same time, more than 6 million articles are published in more than 20,000 





biomedical journals every year58, with MEDLINE alone containing over 22 million indexed citations 
from more than 5,600 journals.59  In addition, 75 randomized clinical trials and 11 systematic reviews 
are published every day.60 This information explosion needs to be contrasted against the human 
brain’s limited capacity for information processing, memory limitations, and storage capability.57 The 
theory of Bounded Rationality (which serves as the basis for Principle #4, Table 2) posits that 
rationality depends on the context and should respect epistemological, environmental and 
computational constraints of human brains.7 Under the real-life complexity of the health care system 
and the limitations of human information processing, rational behavior relies on satisficing process 
(i.e., finding a good enough solution)7,57,61 instead of maximizing i.e. finding best possible solution.  
Satisficing is sometimes employed via heuristics, which represent mechanisms to implement 
bounded rationality.62 Heuristics are widely used in medical education, as a popular “mental 
shortcuts”, “rules of thumb”, clinical pathways and algorithms. The use of heuristics is defined as 
“strategy that ignores part of the information, with the goal of making decisions more quickly, frugally, 
and/or accurately than more complex methods”63 and may sometimes outperform complex statistical 
models (the phenomenon known as “less-is-more”).64   
The principle behind satisficing is that there must exist a point (threshold) at which obtaining more 
information or computation becomes detrimental and costly; the use of heuristics helps the decision 
maker stop before this threshold has been crossed. 64 Its practical implementation in clinical medicine 
often occurs via fast-and-frugal trees (FFT), highly effective, simple decision trees composed of 
sequentially ordered cues (tests) and binary (yes/no) decisions formulated via a series of if-then 
statements.65 FFT can be linked to EUT and regret via the threshold model.65 A variant of satisficing, 
known as “robust satisficing” is proposed to regulate regret41,42,56,  the concept similar to “acceptable 
regret”: we can rationally accept some losses without feeling regret.47,48 “Acceptable regret” is shown 
to explain both under- and over-use when compared against deviation from normative standards.47,48 
It explains why the “stubborn quest for diagnostic certainty”66, over-testing in the face of already-





sufficient evidence, considered as one of the main culprits of increasing health care costs, may not be 
irrational.29,47,48,67 For example, in an end-of-life setting, patients would accept a wrong referral to 
hospice, only if the estimated probability of death within 6 months exceeded 96%, i.e., they would 
accept hospice care without regretting it only if they are virtually certain that death is imminent.67 A 
consequence is the consistently late referral to hospice for dying patients, typically averaging less 
than 1 week.68  
Deontic Introduction Rationality: Linking Rationality of “Is” with Rationality of “Ought” 
Throughout the text, we have referred to the essence of clinical practice as the integration of 
empirical research evidence with categorical actions (yes/no) that fundamentally defines decision-
making. That is, ultimately, in a medical context, rationality requires integration of evidence related to 
the problem at hand (“is”, which is derived from our observations) with the goals and values of 
decisions and (potential) actions (“ought”) (Principles #1 & #2, Table 2). It is these rationally-oriented 
ought decisions that allow us to achieve our goals. We referred to the threshold model of decision-
making as a model that serves as a link between evidence and decision-making.26 Recently, Deontic 
Introduction Theory was developed69,70 to provide psychological mechanisms for how normative 
(a.k.a. ‘deontic’) rules for actions can be generated by linking empirical evidence to values associated 
with the transference of value from goals to actions.69,70 Interestingly, there seems to be an 
evolutionary background both to the need for reliable evidence-to help us function in our 
environment,71,72 and to generation of normative “ought” or “should” rules (“Faced with the knowledge 
that there are hungry children in Somalia, we easily and naturally infer that we ought to donate to 
famine relief charities”).69 Physicians seem to generate deontic “ought” or “should” rules routinely. 
They first naturally link evidence with outcomes to create explanations in terms of causation (“If you 
smoke, you will likely get lung cancer”). They then infer values from outcomes (“Lung cancer is an 
undesirable outcome”, “Smoking is bad”), which in turn results in value transference from goals to 
actions to create a normative conclusion (“You should not smoke”). The action rules thus created 





reflect pragmatic rationality that involves instrumental “oughts”, and should not be confused with 
evaluative “oughts” that reflects overall value judgments such as moral judgments.73  The former are 
typically accurate within a specific setting, constituting if-then rules, while the latter aim at universally 
valid statements (even though they often cannot often be separated from the context). So, acting on 
normative conclusions frequently seen in oncology practice such as, “Given that diagnosis of 
metastatic cancer is made, the patient ought to be treated with chemotherapy,” can be both rational in 
one setting, and irrational in another, resulting either in over-treatment, as often observed in the end-
of-life setting,74 or under-treatment, as in cases when treatment is inappropriately denied based on an 
arbitrary (usually older) age or “excessively high” costs. 
Deontic introduction theory emphasizes the crucial role of context in generating normative rules to 
guide behavior. Context defines the goals of the individual as well as their beliefs in how to cause 
them to materialize. According to grounded rationality75 (Table 1), the rational course of action 
represents the action aimed to achieve our goals as a function of epistemic context – the evidence 
and knowledge available to us at the time of making such decisions. Such epistemic context is 
subject to cognitive variability, that is, the individual and cultural characteristics of the decision maker. 
For example, decisions on opting for palliative care are sensitive to cultural and individual values.76 
This again serves to underline our thesis that no single theory of rationality can fit all decision makers 
in all contexts. What might be rational for a specific context, may not be rational in a different context, 
and might not even be rational for another provider in a similar medical context but a different culture.  
Discussion 
Rationality revolves around finding the most effective procedures to achieve our goals.7 As no “one 
size model” fits all clinical circumstances,7 these goals may be differently pursued and achieved 
under different theories of rationality. Purely normative models can often be off the mark as they rely 
on mathematical abstractions, whereas prescriptive models of rationality10 aim to realize rational 





solutions by relying on the accumulated knowledge on human cognitive architecture, and makes 
recommendations accordingly. We propose that prescriptive rational models in clinical decision 
making should also make use of which model best fits a specific context. For example, operational 
achievements of the goals in health care can be realized by linking evidence with decisions via the 
threshold model.26 According to the threshold model, rational decision-making represents prescribing 
treatment or ordering a test, when the benefits of treatment exceeds its harms at given probability of 
disease or clinical outcome.26 However, as we discussed above, thresholds can vary26, as a function 
of different contextual factors that play role in some theories of decision-making and not in others. As 
a result, what is defined as rational or irrational actions resulting in overuse or underuse is inextricably 
intertwined with theoretical frameworks within which these decisions are considered. That is, rational 
behavior under one theory may be irrational under a different theoretical viewpoint.  
One of the fundamental challenges in medical decision-making is that goals often conflict and that 
rational attempts to achieve one goal may conflict with achieving another. According to Stanovich,43 
rationality means achieving a coherence among goals; we need to rely on both normative and 
descriptive procedures to coherently integrate across goals. This is known as meta-rationality43- 
asking reflectively about the appropriateness of our emotional reactions to a decision. ”The trick may 
be to value formal principles of rationality, but not to take them too seriously”.43 
However, coherent integration of goals may sometimes be impossible. For example, we may have a 
rational goal to extend a patient’s life, but resource use may exceed what is affordable. That is, 
decision-makers often face a trade-off between goals and interests of individuals and society, pitching 
duty-bound, deontological decisions against the utilitarian ethics. These goals are often expressed in 
terms of “value”, where “value” is defined as equivalent to clinical benefit/cost. Formally, the most 
common metric to gauge the “right” value for health care is to calculate the incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER) among competing health interventions [ICER=(cost1-
cost2)/(effectiveness1-effectiveness2)]. Typically, effectiveness is expressed as quality life adjusted 





year (QALY) gained for determining whether a given health intervention is considered beneficial. 
What is acceptable ICER depends on a particular society, which may decide not to offer a particular 
treatment or a diagnostic test if the societally-agreed upon ICER threshold is exceeded. In the US, for 
example, the generally acceptable ICER threshold is between $50K to $200K/QALY.77 In contrast, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) considers an intervention to be cost-effective if the cost of the 
intervention per disability-adjusted life-year (DALY) averted is less than three times the country’s 
annual GDP per capita.78 Using a different definition, and ignoring relevant context such as the 
disease burden and the available budget, may result in a paradoxical -- and seemingly irrational -- 
allocation of a country’s health budget, as demonstrated by Marseille et al in their analysis of the 
WHO ICER thresholds.78  
Fundamentally, all these initiatives expose tensions between societal vs. individual interests.49 
Interestingly, a test of the role of Deontic Introduction in moral inference found that the tendency to 
infer normative conclusions mostly coheres with utilitarian (rather than deontological) judgments70, 
which can explain increasing outrage over ever increasing health care costs.79 
Another example of a goal conflict, one too often leading to “overtreatment” with aggressive therapy 
rather than a more appropriate palliative approach including hospice, is the end-of-life setting. The 
usual goal for medical decision-making is to improve health, but what are goals at the end-of-life? A 
“good death” is not better health in the usual sense, yet it can be rationally accepted, most importantly 
at the level of intrinsic emotional peace. A theoretic approach to rational decision making must 
accommodate this goal. Here again, invoking regret may prove the mechanism allowing the peaceful 
exit that all humans desire. Consistent with Aristotle's “dead bed test” of no regret - life lived with no 
unfulfilled potentials weighing on our souls – it was found that elicitation of regret can actually improve 
decision-making at the end of life.80 Thus, rational decision-making has to take into account both 
analytical and affect-based reasoning. A “unifying theory of rationality” is likely not possible, 
particularly because decision-making is extremely context-sensitive (and, as explained, normative 





theories typically do not take context into account)7. We also believe that context-setting is a 
prerequisite to a rational approach to both practical and theoretical considerations to problem-solving 
and decision-making. How given clinical problem should be approached is ultimately an empirical 
question. By calling for “normative pluralism” and pragmatic rationality, according to which the context 
and the clinical situation should be matched to a contextually-appropriate theory of rationality, we 
believe that the current unsatisfactory situation in health care could dramatically improve. Although 
this position incorporates an element of relativism, it is a moderate type of relativism rather than a 
stronger ‘anything goes’ version.81,82 
Our paper also has important practical implications. Physicians are increasingly paid according to the 
quality of care they deliver and penalized for overuse /underuse.83 What our analysis shows is that 
these policy initiatives cannot be devoid of the theoretical rationality framework in which quality 
improvement assessments operate. Financing of healthcare services, which is increasingly being 
proposed to be a function of the measurement of over- and under-use of health services, should be 
determined based on the choice of theoretical framework. 
We believe that an attempt to define theoretical framework(s) to measure appropriateness of care is 
what is largely missing in the current discussion of over-and under-use of care. Even though both 
over- and underuse are widely acknowledged as an empirical phenomena in modern health care11,84-
87, actual measurement of over- and underuse has been difficult to achieve.84,85 Two methodological 
approaches have dominated measurements of over-and under-use: 1) comparison of the use of 
health care services against some sort of pre-defined “truth” or “gold standard”;2) detecting 
unexpectedly wide variations in the delivery of health-care services.84,85 The first approach relies on 
the “correspondence theory of truth”, which assumes that there is “objective reality”  and that “truth” is 
based on the correspondence of ideas, concepts, and theories with facts.88,89 This typically takes a 
form of measuring outcomes against evidence-based guidelines. However, as discussed above, 
evidence is often challenged and finding an incontrovertible “truth” that is uniformly accepted is, in 





practice, extremely difficult, perhaps impossible. One possible solution is by seeking correspondence 
with the goals of the decision-maker (rather than with an “objective truth” outside the decision-maker), 
as argued above. 
The second approach, which measures over- and underuse by assessing (wide) variation in care, 
relies on the “coherence theory of truth”, according to which statements or judgments are “true” if they 
cohere with other judgments or statements.88,89 Thus, it is assumed that similar patients in similar 
conditions in similar settings should be managed similarly, with minimal variation. The approach is 
typically based on the analysis of practice patterns from large data-sets,76,77 and fundamentally 
disregards individual patients’ circumstances and their values and preferences. For example, use of 
more medicalized terminology in discussions with patients often leads to more aggressive treatment 
and overuse.90 In this sense, coherenc  is often used to define “rationality”- given  the premises, 
certain conclusions “have to” be arrived at if a rational reasoning process is followed. However, 
deductive argument validity only guarantees rational conclusions given rational premises, which is not 
necessarily the case. If the premises are false, the conclusion will also be false. In contrast, 
correspondence is concerned with the accuracy of judgments or claims against some criterion of 
accuracy,88,89 which makes it potentially more useful for rationality in clinical decision making.  
Ultimately, we argue, both measurement and mitigations of over- and under-use will not improve until 
they are placed within a better framework of rationality theories.88,89 Although there are many theories 
of truth, broadly speaking, normative theories of rationality reflect the coherence theory of truth, while 
descriptive theries of rationality tend to rely on the correspondence theory of truth. As we stress 
above, different medical problems will require different theoretical approaches, and, in our view, 
further advances in health care, including reducing the rates of over-and underuse will not be possible 
without an explicit identification of the theoretical framework from which the problem is addressed. 
 












Figure 1. Threshold model of decision-making. A) The model states that the most rational decision is 
to prescribe treatment when the expected treatment benefit outweighs its expected harms at given 
probability of disease or clinical outcome. The horizontal line indicate the probability at which 
physicians should treat the patient with suspected tuberculosis (2.7%). B) Actual threshold for treating 
a patient suspected of having tuberculosis (based on Basinga et al27; graph: courtesy of Dr. Jef Van 
den Ende(see Table 1 and text for details) 
 
  






A list of major theories and models of rationality relevant to medical decision-making7 
Normative Theories of Rationality 
Evidence-based Medicine approach to rational decision-making
13: a normative theory, which posits that there is a link between rationality and 
believing what is true [Our actions and beliefs are justifiable (or, reasonable/rational) as a function of the trustworthiness of the evidence, and the extent 
to which we believe that evidence is determined by credible processes]. See also: epistemic rationality 




Epistemic rationality: The rationality based on acquisition of true / fit-for-purpose knowledge. Linked to new mind rationality51 (see also Grounded 
Rationality). 
Example: Evidence-based medicine approach to decision-making. 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) - Decision analysis / Bayesian rationality 
92
/ The type of rationality associated with conformity to a normative standard 
such as the probability calculus or classical logic. In medicine, the most dominant normative theory is EUT, which is based on mathematical axioms of 
rationality according to which rational choice is associated with selection of the alternative with higher expected utility (Expected utility is the average of 
all possible results weighted by their  corresponding probabilities). It is typically based on Bayesian probability calculus.*  
Example: decision analyses such as EUT-based micro simulation model to develop screening recommendations for colorectal cancer.
23
 
Descriptive Theories of Rationality 
Adaptive or Ecological Rationality
63,64: a variant of bounded rationality, which stipulates that human decision-making depends on the context and 
environmental cues; hence, rational behavior/decision-making requires adaptation to environment/patient circumstances. Sometimes referred to as 
‘Panglossian’9,93, the position that humans should be considered to be a priori rational due to optimal evolutionary processes. 
Example: Extrapolation of research evidence to specific patient circumstances including social context, co-morbidities, etc dominates medical practice 
Argumentative Theory of Reasoning
30,31 proposes that reason and rational thinking has evolutionary evolved with primary social function to justify one 
selves and convince others to be believed and gain their trust. 
Example: Doctors invoke evidence-based knowledge out of sense that it would be approved by the medical community and, in doing, preserve their 
reputation and improve health of their patients. 
Bounded Rationality
61,94: posits that, reflective of principle, that rationality should respect epistemological, environmental and computational constraints 
of human brains, rational behavior relies on satisficing process (finding a good enough solution) instead of EUT maximizing approach. The heuristic 
approach to decision-making is the mechanism of implementation of bounded rationality.62 Often linked to prescriptive models of rationality95, designs 
for improvement of human rationality informed by cognitive architecture.  
Example: Simple fast-and-frugal tree using readily available clinical cues outperformed 50 variables multivariable logistic model regarding decision 




- a descriptive theory of inference from “Is” to “Ought”- implies that rationality requires integration of the evidence related 
to the problem at hand  (“Is”) with the goals and values to decisions and actions (“Ought”), while taking context into account. See also: Grounded 
Rationality. 
Example: Evidence (‘Is”) shows that if prostate cancer patients receive detailed information about hormone therapy, their decision making style 
improves; policy makers infer that patients should receive detailed information.
96
 
Dual processing theories of rational thought (DPTRT)
9: a family of theories based on the architecture of human cognition, contrasting intuitive (“type 
1”) processes with effortful (“type 2) processes. A descriptive variant of this approach is that the rational action should be coherent with formal principles 
of rationality as well as human intuitions about good decisions. The normative / prescriptive variant of this theory is sometimes referred to as 
‘Meliorism’9,93, the position that humans are often irrational but can be educated to be rational. According to Meliorist principles, when the goals of the 
genes clash with the goals of the individual (see below), the rational course of action should be dictated by the latter.  
Example: Physicians often adjust their recommendations based on their intuition.
97
 
DPTRT can be thought of as a combination / contrast of: 
Old mind / Evolutionary rationality / rationality of the genes
51,98
: The rationality linked to evolutionarily-instilled goals (sex, hunger, etc). 
Past-oriented and relying on type 1 mechanisms, it is driven by the evolutionary past and by experiential learning 
Example: Eating chocolates when one has to reduce weight. 
New mind / Individual rationality
51,98
. The rationality linked to the goals of the individual rather than those of the genes. It is future-oriented 
and relies on type 2 mechanisms, most importantly the ability to run mental simulations of future events and hypothetical situations. This is 
what enables humans to think consequentially and solve novel problems 





Example: Use of contraceptives. The genes’ goal is to self-replicate, i.e. to produce more copies of themselves. Contraceptives negate this 
goal while allowing humans greater individual freedom.   
Grounded Rationality
75
: a descriptive theory, which postulates that rationality should be judged within epistemic context i.e. what is known to a 
decision-maker and his/her goals, and that rational course of is the one that facilitates the achievement of our goals given the context. See also 
Pragmatic Rationality. 
Example: To achieve health goals, physicians typically recommend treatment with which they are familiar/know about. 
Meta-rationality
43 or the Master rationality Motive99: relies on DPTRT, which posits that rationality represents hierarchical goal integration while taking 
into account both emotions and reasons. It also refers to integration of so called Thin theories of rationality: Theories in which the goals, context and 
desires of behavior are not evaluated (as per ,for example, applying EUT without taking patient’s desires into account) – that is, any goal is as good as 
any other goal with  Broad theories of rationality: Theories of rationality in which the goals and desires of the decision maker are evaluated within 
context and in such a way as to achieve hierarchical coherence within goals.98,100 
Example: Meta-rationality model of rationality subsumes other variants of DPTRT. The approach based on meta-rationality is often characteristic of a 
“wise” physician; the approach is particularly evident in high-stake, high-emotional decisions such as end-of-life where the substantive goals about 
achievable health status have to be reconciled with patient/physician emotional reaction to a proposed decision 
Pragmatic/instrumental rationality/ rationality1
8
  or substantive rationality
41,42: a descriptive theory, which states that rationality depends on the 
content not only on the structure of decisions (process) and that the content should be assessed in light of short and long-term goals (purpose). Fits with 
the Descriptivist approach73 which argues that empirical evidence cannot support the ‘oughtness’ of a model. 
Example: Pragmatic rationality dominates clinical decision-making particularly in the fields such as oncology, where desirable health goals (e.g. cure) 
may not be possible; as a result, the re-evaluation of both goals and decision procedures may be needed (e.g., switch from aggressive treatment to 
palliative care in advanced incurable cancers, etc) 
Regret regulation-rationality is characterized by regulation of regret
56: This is a variant of DPTRT that relies on regret, which as a cognitive emotion 
uses counterfactual reasoning processes to tap in analytical aspect of our cognitive architecture as well as in affect-based decision-making. According to 
this view, medical rational decision-making is associated with regret-averse decision processes. 
Example: Contemporary medical practice has increasingly adopted that patients’ values and preferences should be consulted before a given health 
intervention is given. However, patient values and preferences heavily depend on emotions such as regret, which, if properly elicited, may improve 




41,42: a variant of regret-based DPTRT according to which rational course is to “maximize confidence in a good enough outcome even 
if the things go poorly” (instead of maximizing EUT) “; the concept, which is similar to “acceptable regret” 47,48hypothesis of rational decision-making, 
which postulates that we can rationally accept some losses without feeling regret. 
Example: Annual screening mammography over 10 years in women older than 50 will prevent 1 death per 1,000  from breast cancer but at cost of 50-
200 unnecessary false alarms and 2-10 unnecessary breast removals.
101
 When it comes to the decision like these, which are value, and emotionally 




Threshold model of rational action proposes that the most rational decision is to prescribe treatment or order a diagnostic test when the expected 
treatment benefit outweighs its expected harms at given probability of disease or clinical outcome.26 It has been formulated both within EUT24,25, dual 
processing theories53 and regret framework.26,28,47,48 
Example: see text and Fig 1 
___ 
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Core ingredients (“Principles”) of rationality commonly identified across theoretical models7 
• P1: Most major theories of choice agree that rational decision-making requires integrations of 
• Benefits (gains) 
• Harms (losses)  
in order to fulfill our goals (e.g., better health) 
• P2: It typically occurs under conditions of uncertainty 
• rational approach requires reliable evidence to deal with the inherent uncertainties 
• relies on cognitive processes that allow integration of probabilities/uncertainties 
• P3: Rational thinking should be informed by human cognitive architecture  
• composed of type 1 reasoning processes, which characterizes  “old mind” (affect-based, 
intuitive, fast, resource-frugal) and type 2 processes (analytic and deliberative, 
consequential driven, and effortful) of “new mind” 
• P4: Rationality depends on the context and should respect epistemological, environmental 
and computational constraints of human brains  
• P5: Rationality (in medicine) is closely linked to ethics and morality of our actions 
• Requires consideration of utilitarian (society-oriented), duty-bound (individual-
oriented) and right-based (autonomy, “no decision about me, without me”) ethics 
____ 
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